Bush: Critics Of Gitmo, Abu Ghraib And Rendition Are ‘Slandering America’»

During an interview with President Bush on Britain’s Sky News yesterday, Sky political editor Adam Boulton noted that while Bush talks “a lot about freedom,” there are many who say that some of the Bush administration’s torture and detention policies represent “the complete opposite of freedom.” But Bush quickly snapped back, saying those criticizing his policies are slandering America:

BOULTON: There are those who would say look, lets take Guantanamo Bay, and Abu Ghraib, and rendition and all those things and to them that is the complete opposite of freedom.

BUSH: Of course, if you want to slander America.

So, according to Bush, below is a short — but by no means exhaustive — list of those who have suggested that Bush’s terrorism policies represent “the opposite of freedom” and thus have slandered America:

– The United States Supreme Court: The Court ruled last week that “terrorism suspects held at Guantanamo Bay have a right to seek their release in federal court” saying that Bush’s policy compromised “the Constitution’s guarantee of liberty.”

– The Federal Bureau of Investigation: An FBI report issued last month said that according to its agents, “[m]ilitary officials at Guantanamo Bay used some aggressive techniques before they were approved, possibly in violation of Defense Department policy and U.S. law.”

– McClatchy Newspapers: An eight month McClatchy investigation found that after the Sept. 11, 2001, the U.S. has wrongfully imprisoned “perhaps hundreds” of men “in Afghanistan, Cuba and elsewhere on the basis of flimsy or fabricated evidence, old personal scores or bounty payments.”

Boulton told Bush that the Supreme Court “ruled against what you have been doing” at Guantanamo but Bush wouldn’t budge, arguing that the district court, appellate court and Congress agreed that Gitmo detainees do not have to right to challenge their detention.

Boulton, a Briton, then had to remind Bush of America’s checks and balances system: “But the Supreme Court is supreme isn’t it?”

America’s prison for terrorists often held the wrong men

GARDEZ, Afghanistan — The militants crept up behind Mohammed Akhtiar as he squatted at the spigot to wash his hands before evening prayers at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp.

They shouted “Allahu Akbar” — God is great — as one of them hefted a metal mop squeezer into the air, slammed it into Akhtiar’s head and sent thick streams of blood running down his face.

Akhtiar was among the more than 770 terrorism suspects imprisoned at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. They are the men the Bush administration described as “the worst of the worst.”

But Akhtiar was no terrorist. American troops had dragged him out of his Afghanistan home in 2003 and held him in Guantanamo for three years in the belief that he was an insurgent involved in rocket attacks on U.S. forces. The Islamic radicals in Guantanamo’s Camp Four who hissed “infidel” and spat at Akhtiar, however, knew something his captors didn’t: The U.S. government had the wrong guy.

“He was not an enemy of the government, he was a friend of the government,” a senior Afghan intelligence officer told McClatchy. Akhtiar was imprisoned at Guantanamo on the basis of false information that local anti-government insurgents fed to U.S. troops, he said.

An eight-month McClatchy investigation in 11 countries on three continents has found that Akhtiar was one of dozens of men — and, according to several officials, perhaps hundreds — whom the U.S. has wrongfully imprisoned in Afghanistan, Cuba and elsewhere on the basis of flimsy or fabricated evidence, old personal scores or bounty payments.

McClatchy interviewed 66 released detainees, more than a dozen local officials — primarily in Afghanistan — and U.S. officials with intimate knowledge of the detention program. The investigation also reviewed thousands of pages of U.S. military tribunal documents and other records.

This unprecedented compilation shows that most of the 66 were low-level Taliban grunts, innocent Afghan villagers or ordinary criminals. At least seven had been working for the U.S.-backed Afghan government and had no ties to militants, according to Afghan local officials. In effect, many of the detainees posed no danger to the United States or its allies.

The investigation also found that despite the uncertainty about whom they were holding, U.S. soldiers beat and abused many prisoners.

Prisoner mistreatment became a regular feature in cellblocks and interrogation rooms at Bagram and Kandahar air bases, the two main way stations in Afghanistan en route to Guantanamo.

While he was held at Afghanistan’s Bagram Air Base, Akhtiar said, “When I had a dispute with the interrogator, when I asked, ‘What is my crime?’ the soldiers who took me back to my cell would throw me down the stairs.”

The McClatchy reporting also documented how U.S. detention policies fueled support for extremist Islamist groups. For some detainees who went home far more militant than when they arrived, Guantanamo became a school for jihad, or Islamic holy war.

Of course, Guantanamo also houses Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks, who along with four other high-profile detainees faces military commission charges. Cases also have been opened against 15 other detainees for assorted offenses, such as attending al Qaida training camps.

But because the Bush administration set up Guantanamo under special rules that allowed indefinite detention without charges or federal court challenge, it’s impossible to know how many of the 770 men who’ve been held there were terrorists.

A series of White House directives placed “suspected enemy combatants” beyond the reach of U.S. law or the 1949 Geneva Conventions’ protections for prisoners of war. President Bush and Congress then passed legislation that protected those detention rules.

However, the administration’s attempts to keep the detainees beyond the law came crashing down last week.

The Supreme Court ruled Thursday that detainees have the right to contest their cases in federal courts, and that a 2006 act of Congress forbidding them from doing so was unconstitutional. “Some of these petitioners have been in custody for six years with no definitive judicial determination as to the legality of their detention,” the court said in its 5-4 decision, overturning Bush administration policy and two acts of Congress that codified it.

One former administration official said the White House’s initial policy and legal decisions “probably made instances of abuse more likely. … My sense is that decisions taken at the top probably sent a signal that the old rules don’t apply … certainly some people read what was coming out of Washington: The gloves are off, this isn’t a Geneva world anymore.”

Like many others who previously worked in the White House or Defense Department, the official spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the legal and political sensitivities of the issue.

McClatchy’s interviews are the most ever conducted with former Guantanamo detainees by a U.S. news organization. The issue of detainee backgrounds has previously been reported on by other media outlets, but not as comprehensively.

McClatchy also in many cases did more research than either the U.S. military at Guantanamo, which often relied on secondhand accounts, or the detainees’ lawyers, who relied mainly on the detainees’ accounts.

The Pentagon declined to discuss the findings. It issued a statement Friday saying that military policy always has been to treat detainees humanely, to investigate credible complaints of abuse and to hold people accountable. The statement says that an al Qaida manual urges detainees to lie about prison conditions once they’re released. “We typically do not respond to each and every allegation of abuse made by past and present detainees,” the statement said.

LITTLE INTELLIGENCE VALUE

The McClatchy investigation found that top Bush administration officials knew within months of opening the Guantanamo detention center that many of the prisoners there weren’t “the worst of the worst.” From the moment that Guantanamo opened in early 2002, former Secretary of the Army Thomas White said, it was obvious that at least a third of the population didn’t belong there.

Of the 66 detainees whom McClatchy interviewed, the evidence indicates that 34 of them, about 52 percent, had connections with militant groups or activities. At least 23 of those 34, however, were Taliban foot soldiers, conscripts, low-level volunteers or adventure-seekers who knew nothing about global terrorism.

Only seven of the 66 were in positions to have had any ties to al Qaida’s leadership, and it isn’t clear that any of them knew any terrorists of consequence.

If the former detainees whom McClatchy interviewed are any indication — and several former high-ranking U.S. administration and defense officials said in interviews that they are — most of the prisoners at Guantanamo weren’t terrorist masterminds but men who were of no intelligence value in the war on terrorism.

Far from being an ally of the Taliban, Mohammed Akhtiar had fled to Pakistan shortly after the puritanical Islamist group took power in 1996, the senior Afghan intelligence officer told McClatchy. The Taliban burned down Akhtiar’s house after he refused to ally his tribe with their government.

The Americans detained Akhtiar, the intelligence officer said, because they were given bad information by another Afghan who’d harbored a personal vendetta against Akhtiar going back to his time as a commander against the Soviet military during the 1980s.

“In some of these cases, tribal feuds and political feuds have played a big role” in people getting sent to Guantanamo, the intelligence officer said.

He didn’t want his name used, partly because he didn’t want to offend the Western officials he works with and partly because Afghan intelligence officers are assassinated regularly.

“There were Afghans being sent to Guantanamo because of bad intelligence,” said Helaluddin Helal, Afghanistan’s deputy interior minister for security from 2002 to early 2004. “In the beginning, everyone was trying to give intelligence to the Americans … the Americans were taking action without checking this information.”

Nusrat Khan was in his 70s when American troops shoved him into an isolation cell at Bagram in the spring of 2003. They blindfolded him, put earphones on his head and tied his hands behind his back for almost four weeks straight, Khan said.

By the time he was taken out of the cell, Khan — who’d had at least two strokes years before he was arrested and was barely able to walk — was half-mad and couldn’t stand without help. Khan said that he was taken to Guantanamo on a stretcher.

Several Afghan officials, including the country’s attorney general, later said that Khan, who spent more than three years at Guantanamo, wasn’t a threat to anyone; he’d been turned in as an insurgent leader because of decades-old rivalries with competing Afghan militias.

Ghalib Hassan was an Interior Ministry-appointed district commander in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province, a man who’d risked his life to help the U.S.-backed government. Din Mohammed, the former governor of that province and now the governor of Kabul, said there was no question that local tribal leaders, offended by Hassan’s brusque style, fed false information about him to local informants used by American troops.

The Pentagon declined requests to make top officials, including the secretary of defense, available to respond to McClatchy’s findings. The defense official in charge of detainee affairs, Sandra Hodgkinson, refused to speak with McClatchy.

The Pentagon’s only response to a series of written questions from McClatchy, and to a list of 63 of the 66 former detainees interviewed for this story, was a three-paragraph statement.

“These unlawful combatants have provided valuable information in the struggle to protect the U.S. public from an enemy bent on murder of innocent civilians,” Col. Gary Keck said in the statement. He provided no examples.

Rear Adm. Mark H. Buzby, until recently the commanding officer at Guantanamo, said that detainees had supplied crucial information about al Qaida, the Taliban and other terrorist groups.

“Included with the folks that were brought here in 2002 were, by and large, the main leadership of al Qaida and the Taliban,” he said in a phone interview.

Buzby agreed, however, that some detainees were from the bottom rung.

“It’s all about developing the mosaic … there’s value to both ends of the spectrum,” he said.

Former senior U.S. defense and intelligence officials, however, said McClatchy’s conclusions squared with their own observations.

“As far as intelligence value from those in Gitmo, I got tired of telling the people writing reports based on their interrogations that their material was essentially worthless,” a U.S. intelligence officer said in an e-mail, using the military’s slang for Guantanamo.

Guantanamo authorities periodically sent analysts at the U.S. Central Command “rap sheets on various prisoners and asked our assessment whether they merited continued confinement,” said the analyst, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject. “Over about three years, I assessed around 40 of these individuals, mostly Afghans. … I only can remember recommending that ONE should be kept at GITMO.”

‘WAR COUNCIL’ REWRITES DETAINEE LAW

At a Pentagon briefing in the spring of 2002, a senior Army intelligence officer expressed doubt about the entire intelligence-gathering process.

“He said that we’re not getting anything, and his thought was that we’re not getting anything because there might not be anything to get,” said Donald J. Guter, a retired rear admiral who was the head of the Navy’s Judge Advocate General’s Corps at the time.

Many detainees were “swept up in the pot” by large operations conducted by Afghan troops allied with the Americans, said former Army Secretary White, who’s now a partner at DKRW Energy, an energy company in Houston.

One of the Afghan detainees at Guantanamo, White recalled, was more than 80 years old.

Army Spc. Eric Barclais, who was a military intelligence interrogator at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan from September 2002 through January 2003, told military investigators in sworn testimony that “We recommended lots of folks be released from (Bagram), but they were not. I believe some people ended up at (Guantanamo) that had no business being sent there.”

“You have to understand some folks were detained because they got turned in by neighbors or family members who were feuding with them,” Barclais said. “Yes, they had weapons. Everyone had weapons. Some were Soviet-era and could not even be fired.”

A former Pentagon official told McClatchy that he was shocked at times by the backgrounds of men held at Guantanamo.

” ‘Captured with weapon near the Pakistan border?’ ” the official said. “Are you kidding me?”

“The screening, the understanding of who we had was horrible,” he said. “That’s why we had so many useless people at Gitmo.”

In 2002, a CIA analyst interviewed several dozen detainees at Guantanamo and reported to senior National Security Council officials that many of them didn’t belong there, a former White House official said.

Despite the analyst’s findings, the administration made no further review of the Guantanamo detainees. The White House had determined that all of them were enemy combatants, the former official said.

Rather than taking a closer look at whom they were holding, a group of five White House, Justice Department and Pentagon lawyers who called themselves the “War Council” devised a legal framework that enabled the administration to detain suspected “enemy combatants” indefinitely with few legal rights.

The threat of new terrorist attacks, the War Council argued, allowed President Bush to disregard or rewrite American law, international treaties and the Uniform Code of Military Justice to permit unlimited detentions and harsh interrogations.

The group further argued that detainees had no legal right to defend themselves, and that American soldiers — along with the War Council members, their bosses and Bush — should be shielded from prosecution for actions that many experts argue are war crimes.

With the support of Bush, Cheney and then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, the group shunted aside the military justice system, and in February 2002, Bush suspended the legal protection for detainees spelled out in Common Article Three of the 1949 Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, which outlaws degrading treatment and torture.

The Bush administration didn’t launch a formal review of the detentions until a 2004 Supreme Court decision forced it to begin holding military tribunals at Guantanamo. The Supreme Court ruling last week said that the tribunals were deeply flawed, but it didn’t close them down.

In late 2004, Pentagon officials decided to restrict further interrogations at Guantanamo to detainees who were considered “high value” for their suspected knowledge of terrorist groups or their potential of returning to the battlefield, according to Matthew Waxman, who was the deputy assistant secretary of defense for detainee affairs, the Defense Department’s head official for detainee matters, from August 2004 to December 2005.

“Maybe three-quarters of the detainees by 2005 were no longer regularly interrogated,” said Waxman, who’s now a law professor at Columbia University.

At that time, about 500 men were still being held at Guantanamo.

So far, the military commissions have publicly charged only six detainees — less than 1 percent of the more than 770 who’ve been at Guantanamo — with direct involvement in the 9-11 terrorist attacks; they dropped the charges in one case. Those few cases are now in question after the high court’s ruling Thursday.

About 500 detainees — nearly two out of three — have been released.

During a military review board hearing at Guantanamo, Mohammed Akhtiar had some advice for the U.S. officers seated before him.

“I wish,” he said, “that the United States would realize who the bad guys are and who the good guys are.”

HOW FOOT SOLDIERS, FARMERS GOT SWEPT UP

How did the United States come to hold so many farmers and goat herders among the real terrorists at Guantanamo? Among the reasons:

After conceding control of the country to U.S.-backed Afghan forces in late 2001, top Taliban and al Qaida leaders escaped to Pakistan, leaving the battlefield filled with ragtag groups of volunteers and conscripts who knew nothing about global terrorism.

The majority of the detainees taken to Guantanamo came into U.S. custody indirectly, from Afghan troops, warlords, mercenaries and Pakistani police who often were paid cash by the number and alleged importance of the men they handed over. Foot soldiers brought in hundreds of dollars, but commanders were worth thousands. Because of the bounties — advertised in fliers that U.S. planes dropped all over Afghanistan in late 2001 — there was financial incentive for locals to lie about the detainees’ backgrounds. Only 33 percent of the former detainees — 22 out of 66 — whom McClatchy interviewed were detained initially by U.S. forces. Of those 22, 17 were Afghans who’d been captured around mid-2002 or later as part of the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan, a fight that had more to do with counter-insurgency than terrorism.

American soldiers and interrogators were susceptible to false reports passed along by informants and officials looking to settle old grudges in Afghanistan, a nation that had experienced more than two decades of occupation and civil war before U.S. troops arrived. This meant that Americans were likely to arrest Afghans who had no significant connections to militant groups. For example, of those 17 Afghans whom the U.S. captured in mid-2002 or later, at least 12 of them were innocent of the allegations against them, according to interviews with Afghan intelligence and security officials.

Detainees at Guantanamo had no legal venue in which to challenge their detentions. The only mechanism set up to evaluate their status, an internal tribunal in the late summer of 2004, rested on the decisions of rotating panels of three U.S. military officers. The tribunals made little effort to find witnesses who weren’t present at Guantanamo, and detainees were in no position to challenge the allegations against them.

Court backs Guantánamo man on torture

A British resident facing a life sentence at Guantánamo Bay has won a battle in a British court to force the government to hand over documents showing he was tortured into confessing he was a terrorist.

Binyam Mohamed, once a cleaner in Kensington, west London, is accused by the US of being an al-Qaida terrorist intent on the mass murder of civilians.

Yesterday it emerged that the high court had rejected a British government attempt to avoid a court hearing which would decide whether it should reveal evidence showing Mohamed was tortured by the US.

Mohamed, through his lawyers, who have visited him in Guantánamo, alleges he was “rendered” to Morocco, where his torture included his genitals being slashed.

The high court found the UK government supplied America with information to interrogate Mohamed and said the hearing should be held as soon as possible.

Mohamed’s lawyer, Clive Stafford-Smith, said: “I have seen not one shred of evidence against him that was not tortured out of him. We know the British talked to Binyam in Pakistan, told him he was to be rendered and gave information to the US that was used in his torture in Morocco.”

Asia Times: Bush to attack Iran by August.

Asia Times is reporting that “a retired US career diplomat and former assistant secretary of state still active in the foreign affairs community” are alleging that the Bush administration “plans to launch an air strike against Iran within the next two months” :

The source, a retired US career diplomat and former assistant secretary of state still active in the foreign affairs community, speaking anonymously, said last week that the US plans an air strike against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The air strike would target the headquarters of the IRGC’s elite Quds force. With an estimated strength of up to 90,000 fighters, the Quds’ stated mission is to spread Iran’s revolution of 1979 throughout the region.

Last week, the White House denied a story in the Jerusalem Post that claimed that President Bush “intends to attack Iran before the end of his term.”

Censors put limits on Guantánamo photos

Guards put on a mock war court conviction to test the $12 million expeditionary legal compound; censors put a three-tent limit on photos; a Sudanese detainee cracked wise.

 

GUANTANAMO BAY NAVY BASE, Cuba — Pity the photographer who takes a picture of five tents in a row at “Camp Justice.”

Or two whole tents and slivers of two others.

Under the latest rules for ”operational security,” there’s now a three-tent rule for photos the public can see of the tents that house journalists and support staff at the expeditionary legal compound, where reputed al Qaeda kingpin Khalid Sheik Mohammed and four other alleged 9/11 co-conspirators are due to get their first taste of military commission justice June 5.

Censorship of news photos has evolved to show, well, less and less across the 6 ½-year Defense Department venture in detaining and at times interrogating war-on-terrorism suspects here.

And numbers do count.

At Camp Delta, the prison camps, photographers are forbidden from showing two guard towers — or, for that matter, any one detainee’s face, except in shadows that make him look like nobody in particular.

Broadly, the military explains the need for operational security, or OP-SEC, two different ways.

First, they seek to shield from public view any details of this remote base that might help al Qaeda or other enemies of the United States stage an attack.

Second, they want to shield from public view the faces of detainees because the Geneva Conventions prohibit the parade or humiliation of prisoners of war.

• Heard at the war court:

An Air Force judge, Lt. Col. Nancy Paul, at one point told defendant Ibrahim al Qosi, 47, that if he wanted to arrange a phone call home to Sudan through the International Committee of the Red Cross, “This is up to you.”

The slight, dark man with a salt-and-pepper beard looked stunned.

”Me?” he sputtered.

“What can I do? I’m a detainee. I cannot do anything about anything.”

The one thing he could do Thursday, for hours, was refuse an effort by his Pentagon-appointed defense attorney, Navy Cmdr. Suzanne Lachelier, to help orchestrate the call.

• Mindful that the audio broke, the video froze and the power went off earlier this month, military commissions staff spent much of Tuesday testing the technology at their two courtrooms at Camp Justice.

Guards played judge, lawyers and, sometimes detainees, while a technician posed as a witness and an Arabic language translator hired by the war court at one point sat in an alleged terrorist’s seat.

The goal is glitch-free simultaneous hearings at the old retrofitted courtroom as well as the $12 million state-of-the-art expeditionary legal compound, once the war crimes trials get rolling sometime after a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in late June.

So Tuesday morning, U.S. forces were reading from a fake script of a trial of a fictional war on terror detainee named Abdul Khadr of Yemen during a daylong equipment check.

Declared one guard playing a presiding officer: ”Mr. Khadr, this commission has convicted you of conspiracy.” Next Khadr’s jury of military officers, called commissioners, were going into secret session to see the evidence against him.

So the presiding officer ordered the feed cut to the media’s press room.

But the feed kept going, and reporters at an adjacent media center got to watch the guard playing a detainee get convicted twice before lunch.

No one could explain who exactly wrote the fake script and why.

But by afternoon the war court script was gone and guards were back in their places, reciting lines from the 1988 Hollywood hit Big — the Tom Hanks tale of a boy who makes a wish and suddenly finds himself living the life of a man.

Classified documents from Guantanamo captive’s Combatant Status Review Tribunals

In mid 2004 shortly after the United States Supreme Court made its ruling in Rasul v. Bush the United States Department of Defense set up Combatant Status Review Tribunals to convene to consider the combatant status of captives held in it Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.

READ ON: WIKILEAKS

Exclusive: Pentagon delays report on FBI role in detainee abuse

WASHINGTON — The release of a report on the FBI’s role in the interrogations of prisoners in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and Iraq has been delayed for months because the Pentagon is reviewing how much of it should remain classified, according to the Justice Department’s watchdog.

Glenn Fine, the Justice Department’s inspector general, told McClatchy that his office has pressed the Defense Department to finish its review, but officials there haven’t completed the process “in a timely fashion.”

“Why that happened, I don’t know,” Fine said in an interview this week.

“It’s been slower than we would like, and it’s taken a long time. We provided our report to them months ago, and we are pushing hard to conclude this process.”

Fine is investigating whether FBI employees participated in detainee abuse, whether they witnessed or reported incidents of abuse, and how such reports were handled by the bureau.

Fine launched his investigation into the FBI’s role in the interrogations in early 2005 amid disclosures that FBI agents had witnessed and complained about harsh interrogation practices of detainees, including seeing Guantanamo Bay detainees who had defecated and urinated on themselves and who had been chained on the floor for more than 24 hours without food or water in more than 100 degree temperatures.

Government agencies that provide information during inspector generals’ investigations are routinely asked to review drafts of reports for accuracy and to determine what information in the reports should remain classified.

Fine said the Pentagon now appears to be moving on his request.

“My sense is they are working hard on it now, and I believe we’re going to reach a resolution one way or another in the not-too-distant future,” he said.

The Defense Department didn’t immediately respond to questions about the delay.

Fine’s comments are a rare critique of a government agency’s handling of one of his inquiries. His office has conducted a series of probes of the administration’s anti-terrorism tactics, but since he took office, Fine has taken pains to appear impartial and never speaks publicly about the contents of a report before its release.

The delays come as the Bush administration is under fire for its legal justifications of harsh interrogation practices, which critics say equated to an endorsement of torture prohibited by U.S. and international laws.

The allegations that FBI agents witnessed the abuse of prisoners were outlined in internal government documents obtained by the American Civil Liberties Union as part of a Freedom of Information lawsuit. The documents raised questions about whether the bureau’s top officials did enough to investigate allegations of detainee abuse by military interrogators and whether military interrogators were impersonating FBI agents to avoid liability against allegations of torture.

Fine has no jurisdiction to investigate the actions of employees of the Defense Department, which has its own inspector general. Fine said his office hasn’t encountered similar problems with the FBI.

“There are issues we are working through regarding the FBI’s comments, but not to the same extent as the delay from the Department of Defense,” he said.

Military lawyers assigned to defend accused 9/11 ploitters

WASHINGTON — The chief defense counsel for the war crimes court at Guantánamo Bay on Monday appointed four U.S. military officers to defend four alleged co-conspirators facing possible death-penalty charges in the 9/11 attacks.

But Army Reserves Col. Steve David said he had not yet formally assigned a lawyer to defend their alleged ringleader, reputed al Qaeda kingpin Khalid Sheik Mohammed.

The assignments had been seen as a key obstacle in the Pentagon’s effort to move forward with its showcase Military Commissions prosecution — a complex, six-captive capital case alleging they organized the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.

CHARGES FILED

The Pentagon prosecutor swore out charges against the six on Feb. 11. Now a Bush administration appointee is deciding whether to go forward and whether to make execution the ultimate penalty — if the men are convicted in the case that lists the names of 2,973 victims in the charges sheets.

”It’s daunting,” said Navy Reserves Cmdr. Suzanne Lachelier, a former San Diego federal public defender called to service and now assigned to defend Ramzi bin al Shibh.

She also, separately, had been assigned another commissions case — to defend a Sudanese man who allegedly served as Osama bin Laden’s bodyguard, driver and cook, Ibrahim al Qosi.

But the 9/11 case, she said, presented “the ultimate challenge for a criminal defense attorney when a defendant is facing so much hatred from the general public — and political backlash, to say the least.”

Bin al Shibh, who was captured on Sept. 11, 2002, is accused of organizing the German-based cell of the suicide squads that hijacked the commercial airplanes that struck the World Trade Center, Pentagon and a Pennsylvania field a year earlier.

KEY INTERMEDIARY

A citizen of Yemen, he has been described as a key intermediary between some of the hijackers and leaders of al Qaeda, in effect meaning he served as the 9/11 control officer. He also has been described as a key lieutenant to Mohammed.

Mohammed and the four other former CIA-held captives accused in the case have never seen attorneys — military or civilian — and are held in segregation as special ”high-value detainees” at the remote prison camps in southeast Cuba.

They arrived there in September 2006 after years in secret U.S. custody overseas.

Now it will be up to the attorneys to get special intelligence clearances and meet with their clients to see whether they will cooperate with their U.S. military lawyers — who are provided to them free of charge under the Military Commissions Act that created the war court in 2006.

David, in civilian life a judge in Boone County, Ind., near Indianapolis, made the appointments days after several civilian legal groups disclosed that they were organizing a defense fund and recruiting teams of top lawyers with death-penalty experience to help in the cases of Mohammed and the others accused at the war court.

The American Civil Liberties Union is spearheading the effort.

OTHER DEFENDANTS

Of the other former CIA-held detainees facing proposed capital charges:

• Walid bin Attash was assigned Navy Reserves Lt. Cmdr. James Hatcher, who has death penalty defense experience as a South Carolina federal public defender. Bin Attash, a Saudi-raised Yemeni, allegedly selected and trained some of the hijackers and allegedly scouted U.S. aircraft as early as 1999 in Malaysia as part of the plot.

• Ali Abd al Aziz Ali was assigned Navy Lt. Cmdr. Brian Mizer, who is already lead lawyer in the non-capital case against Osama bin Laden’s former Afghanistan driver, Salim Hamdan — whose trial is expected to start in June and last at most two weeks. Aziz Ali, known as Ammar al Baluchi, has been described as nephew of Khalid Sheik Mohammed who allegedly sent about $120,000 to the hijackers to cover, among other things, flight training at U.S. flight schools.

• Azzi Ali’s assistant, Mustafa al Hawsawi, was assigned Army Reserves Maj. John Jackson as his defense counsel.

Only one of the six had already been assigned an attorney.

He is Mohammed al Qahtani, a Saudi who has been held by the military, not the CIA, but was subjected to a special course of interrogations approved by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

It was not known whether, as of Monday, his lawyer, Army Lt. Col. Bryan Broyles had yet to meet with him.

SPECIAL ACCESS

The others need special access from the military to see their clients because the CIA has declared as classified the details of their interrogation and detention at so-called ”black sites” overseas.

Lachelier said that David had assured the 9/11 defense counsels that they would get a second uniformed military defense counsel — known as ”a second chair” — as well as an investigator and paralegal to work on the case.

In addition, the ACLU was expected to offer each a civilian co-counsel with outside legal resources to assist in the defense.

Embassy bombings widow calls for civilian trial for detainee

An American college professor whose Kenyan husband was killed in the 1998 al Qaida suicide bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Tanzania said Tuesday that a Guantanamo detainee accused in the attack should be tried in a civilian federal court, not by a military commission.

“These commissions have been fraught with challenges … from coerced evidence to secret evidence,” said Susan Hirsch, a professor at George Mason University outside Washington D.C.

She called the Guantanamo war court, established after the 9/11 attacks, “an unprecedented newly created procedure” that has been “roundly condemned worldwide.”

Hirsch, 48, spoke a day after the Pentagon prosecutor filed proposed charges against Ahmad Ghailani in the embassy bombing that killed her husband. Ghailani was accused of helping gather up the parts for truck bomb that blew through the embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on Aug. 7, 1998.

Ghailani already was indicted in New York 10 years ago for his involvement in the attack, an indictment that possibly could have seen him already tried and sentenced, had he been turned over to civilian prosecutors for trial when he was arrested in Pakistan in July 2004.

Instead, he was held secretly by the CIA until September 2006, then turned over to military authorities, who transferred him to Guantanamo.

Four other men were tried in New York for the East Africa bombings, which struck in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, Kenya, killing more than 220 people, including 12 Americans, and injuring more than 4,000.

Each of the men, who were captured in East Africa and brought to the United States for trial, was convicted and is serving a sentence of life in prison.

Hirsch, whose husband, Abdurahman Abdalla, was waiting outside the embassy while she was inside, cashing a check, both attended and testified as a victim at the trial, which was held in New York City.

“In my view, when Ghailani was picked up in Pakistan in 2004, he could’ve been brought to federal court. That’s the kind of justice I would support,” said Hirsch, a cultural anthropology professor who was teaching at Dar es Salaam University as a Fulbright lecturer in 1998.

What faces Ghailani now is uncertain. The Bush administration established military commissions following the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks to prosecute al Qaida and other war-on-terror captives scooped up abroad.

But the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the first format unconstitutional. The current formula, authorized by the 2006 Military Commissions Act, has been attacked by legal advocates and others for allowing evidence obtained through coercion, holding closed sessions and being overseen by White House appointees subject to political pressure.

Hirsch, who wrote a book, “In The Moment of Greatest Calamity: Terrorism, Grief and a Victim’s Quest for Justice,” about her loss and the subsequent trial, said she’d been notified in advance that the Pentagon was preparing charges against Ghailani.

But she said that she had not been invited to observe proceedings at Guantanamo, as she had been for the New York trials.

If invited, she said, she would consider attending.

A professor of cultural anthropology at George Mason, Hirsch runs the suburban Washington D.C.’s Undergraduate Program Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution.

Hirsch testified in the sentencing phase of the 2001 trial of the four men charged in the bombings — a Lebanese-born naturalized American, a Saudi, a Tanzanian and a Jordanian.

All four got life sentences without possibility of parole.

Monday, the New York U.S. Attorneys office as well as the Department of Justice declined to comment on whether they would seek to prosecute Ghailani in civilian court. The Pentagon’s military commissions legal advisor said Monday there is nothing to prevent both a civilian and a military commission trial.

Hamdan’s lawyer says advisor is exerting illegal sway for political ends

In a motion to dismiss the case against Bin Laden’s ex-driver, he says his Navy superior is pursuing election-year convictions when he is supposed to be impartial.

MIAMI — The lawyer for Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin Laden’s former driver, on Thursday accused U.S. officials of trying to orchestrate war-crimes convictions for election-year political gain.

In his motion for dismissal of the case against Hamdan, Navy Lt. Cmdr. Brian Mizer accused Brig. Gen. Thomas Hartmann — legal advisor to the White House official overseeing terrorism trials at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba — of exercising “unlawful command influence” over both the prosecution and defense. Lawyers participating in the tribunals are members of the U.S. military, and all are subordinate in rank to Hartmann.

More than a dozen suspected senior Al Qaeda figures are among the 280 prisoners currently at Guantanamo, including self-proclaimed Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.

In his 97-page motion, Navy Lt. Cmdr. Brian Mizer cited what he said were inappropriate comments and actions by Hartmann and political appointees in the Guantanamo process — including its top official, Susan J. Crawford, the convening authority.

Hartmann “has so closely aligned himself with the prosecutorial function that he cannot continue to provide the requisite impartial advice to the convening authority,” Mizer said.

Hartmann did not return messages seeking comment. But a spokesman for the tribunals, Army Maj. Robert D. Gifford, said the general had not seen the motion and would have nothing to say immediately about its allegations.

“While the Office of Military Commissions receives notice of court filings, we are not aware if such a motion has even been filed with the trial court,” Gifford said. “Regardless, the proper place for the resolution of any legal matter is in the courtroom.”

In the last six years, only one case against a detainee at Guantanamo Bay has reached its conclusion. Crawford, who served as Pentagon inspector general when Dick Cheney was Defense secretary, in early 2007 facilitated the plea bargain that freed Australian David Hicks.

The move was seen by many as a favor by the Bush administration to Australian Prime Minister John Howard, whose failure to free Hicks was hampering his reelection battle — which he eventually lost.

The former chief prosecutor at Guantanamo, Air Force Col. Morris D. Davis, quit in October after complaining that Hartmann was bringing political pressure to bear on the legal process.

The motion filed Thursday said that Pentagon General Counsel William J. Haynes II had effectively ordered Davis to ensure that the terrorism suspects all were found guilty. “We can’t hold these men for six years and have acquittals. We have to have convictions,” Haynes is quoted as saying when Davis mentioned that some defendants at the World War II Nuremberg trials were acquitted.

Hartmann took over as legal advisor in July and immediately began acting as “de facto chief prosecutor,” Mizer wrote in his motion.